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ARGUMENT
1. Habitual, Patterned, and Repeated Constitutional and Statutory Violations

Regarding Lack of Notice and Lack of Holding Elections; Secret Meetings and
Decisions; and Making Up Office Terms and Alternatives for Not Holding
Elections Are Not De Minimus Procedural Errors.
The Respondents disappointedly, but not surprisingly, in their presentation before the Court have
chosen to ignore the record, facts and reasons for the Usurpation, Declaratory Judgment, and Injunctive
Relief actions brought against them. They have universally refused to accept any accountability for
their actions and their harm to the public. They have refused to acknowledge their lack of diligence and
failure of their duty and opportunity to rectify the lack of elections and their repeated use of secret

1

meetings, secret decisions and secret actions in avoidance of public accountability2. Respondents
simply refuse to address what authority they may take on their own, without judicial scrutiny and
approval, to "cure" the lack of holding required elections and providing the required notices of election.
The "cure" for missing the mandatory 2010 November election for the board position for Yvette Davis
was to continue a pattern of demonstrated democratic dysfunction, neglect and public exclusivity

A. Respondent Yvette Davis did not hold office with authority of law after
her illegal reappointment by the SVCRD Board.
Even if the Court accepts Respondent Davis's theory that she was lawfully in office prior to
January, 2011

3

,

and the Couit accepts that the other directors were holding office legally and with the

authority of law, there is no legal support for the SVCRD Board's illegal appointment of Yvette Davis
to fill the expired term.
Respondent Davis now argues she held office until the successor was elected, but the minutes of
the meeting in January 201 1, show a much different approach than what she is arguing now. The
minutes clearly show the SVCRD Board appointed Davis to fill the term left vacant by expiration of
the term. The position was declared vacant

4

.

The record is void of any claim by Davis prior to her ille-

I Idaho Code § 6 7-2340 defines meetings and provides that the formulation of public policy is public
business and shall not be conducted in "secret."
2 Idaho Code § 67-234 7 Violations, (1) actions at meetings failing to comply with the Open Meeting
Law "shall be null and void": See, Citv ofA1cCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656 (2009).
3 The election for the term was missed; no publication of authority or administrative or judicial
determination approving a replacement election was made; and the advertise position was for
"President" of the SVC RD Board for a term not provided by statute.
4 April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 3, p.22, ln. 1S & 16, January 11, 2011 SVCRD Board
Minutes "Motion by Mike Smith, seconded by Pat Cowles to accept letter of intent from Yvette Davis
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gal appointment that she was the valid hold over office holder. Further, legal counsel for the SVCRD
clearly planned and participated in for her re-appointment as represented to the office of the Attorney
General 5 The Board, \Vithout advertising there would be a vacancy, and in a common theme seen
throughout the SVCRD's existence up to that point in time of making decisions without proper notice
or following the law, decided to appoint Davis to the new term by secret decision. The SVCRD appointed Davis in direct contradiction to Idaho law to fill the position pending a special election. Idaho
Code§. 31-4305 (prohibits board members from appointing a vacancy for expired term); & Id .. Neither the SVCRD Board at the time, nor Davis, nor any of the Respondents now, nor the District Court
in its decision, cite any authority for the holding of a special election to fill the seat vacated by expiration. The record is silent as to any official decision by the S VCRD Board to hold the special election.
This also is de minimus? Better to make it up and argue it is a de minimus procedural error than to provide notice; comply with law; or seek judicial approval for public accountability. This is the Respondents' way.
Respondent Davis then argues that the V CPA should not have taken action to oust Davis from her
seat when the only justification in the public record for her illegal appointment was the vacancy created
by the dereliction of duty by the SVCRD Board, to which she was the longest serving member. Since
the Board acted directly contrary to Idaho law, Davis now points to Clark v. Wonnacott. 30 Idaho 98,
162 P. I 074 (1917) for the justification of her existence on the Board following the expiration of her
term.

B. Clark is greatly distinguishable from the situation Respondent Davis
and fellow SVCRD Board members created·
In Clark, the newly elected county assessor died after the election but prior to taking office. As
a result, Wonnacott continued to hold office as the elected assessor. The county commissioners declared the seat vacant and appointed a successor to Wonnacott. Wonnacott refused to turn over the of-

until May election. No further discussion. Passed unanimously.'' There were no records of any previous
January meetings or meetings in which issue of vacancy, declaring the position vacant, or announcing a
vacant position were made.
5 April 20, 2011 Arment Affidavit, Exhibit 2, p, 2, Paul Fitzer April I, 2011 email to Brian Kane "We
declared the chair vacant on Jan 1 and the Board appointed an interim replacement until the May
election" and April 1, 2011 Affidavit of Mattew C. Williams, Exhibit B, December 7, 20 I 0 letter from
that the Board should declare the
Stephanie Bonnie to Williams, p. 2, In. 14 & 15, "We both
Subdistrict 3 seat vacant at its first meeting in January and appoint a board member to serve until the
election in May."
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fice and litigation ensued. Id .. This Court ruled that until such time as a replacement was elected and
qualified Wonnacott was entitled to the office.
This case presents circumstances much different than those in Clark. Factually and on public
policy grounds promoting democracy, Clark can and should be distinguished from this case. Davis,
though in office for more than 10 years, had never been elected. Wonnacott, the incumbent in Clark
had been duly and lawfully elected. It was through multiple errors of the SVCRD Board, some of
which came during her tenure as the chairman of the Board, that led to her holding office for so many
years without election. Specifically, it was the errors in the 2006 election cycle, as well as the 2010
election cycle, both of which fall squarely on the SVC RD Board, which created the problem. In Clark,
there is no evidence whatsoever that Wonnacott played any role in creating the vacancy. Wonnacotf s
hands were clean. In this case it is undisputed the lack of action on behalf of the Board, even when
prompted by the public that they had to have an election, led to the expiration of the term without a
person being elected or qualifying. To further exacerbate this situation, Davis had done this very same
thing four years earlier in the 2006 election cycle.
Furthermore, the elected Clerk's position is dramatically different from that of a Board member
of the SVCRD. As the sole elected person to the constitutional office of county clerk, leaving the office vacant upon the expiration of the term would not be wise and would cripple that area of the government. As such, the public policy reasons for Wonnacott's lawful holdover are great. The functions
and duties of the elected clerk are set out in the Idaho Constitution and statutes and must be carried out.
The duties cannot be performed without someone in the Clerk's position with the authority oflaw. In
this case, presuming the other Board members were lawfully holding their seats, the SVCRD Board
could have continued to fully function as a Board because the remaining two members were able to fulfill the quorum requirements.
Respondent Davis lacks the clean hands that Wonnacott had in the Clark case and is, at a minimum, partially responsible for the failure to hold a mandated election. Davis was never elected to the
office. Since Davis \Vas responsible for the failure to have an election, Davis should not qualify to hold
over into the office her dereliction caused. As the longest serving member of the SVC RD Board, and
one who had missed a previous election deadline, Davis should have been aware of when her term
would expire. Even when urged by the public she refused to take action on the expiration of her term.

C. Public policy does not support an non-elected officer's right to hold of-

fice beyond the specified term when the officer's actions or inactions
created the vacancy.
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The public policy argument made by the Respondents is based on the District Court's erroneous finding that the errors made are not attributable to the Board. Respondents' Brief pg. 15, 16, and
footnote 58. Though the Respondents correctly cite the District Courts' opinion, they specifically
choose to gloss over the "pattern of procedural errors in the notice of election by the SVC RD over approximately a five year period." Respondents' Brief: footnote 58, pg 15. Further, the Respondents ignore the state of the law prior to the changes impacting elections which changed the responsibility for
the elections on January 1, 2011. The record simply does not support the District Court's findings that
the SVCRD Board, to which Davis was the longest serving member, was not responsible for the election mistakes.
The consistent pattern of failing to follow the simple laws regarding the publishing for and
holding of elections are not small errors. The failure to follow the law disenfranchises voters of their
constitutional right to vote and have representation of their choosing on a Board with taxing authority.
No matter who the SVCRD Board delegates the responsibilities to, it is ultimately their job to prepare
and publish election notices and cancellations, making sure the election schedule is followed for their
district. What is before the Court is not a one-time error vvhich is de minimus. What is before the
Court is a consistent pattern of ignoring and/or thwarting the requirements necessary to have a functioning and duly elected Board accountable to the public. The Respondents' conduct individually and
collectively as the SVCRD Board demonstrates a "pattern" of errors, compounding on each other, to
which the SVCRD and Davis, the only member present through all of the errors and the specific beneficiary of at least three of the errors, failed to address or remedy. Allowing the SVC RD Board to disenfranchise voters to the benefit of the Board members only encourages the conduct which led to the vacancy. Public policy does not, and should not reward a Board member for failing to follow the law
multiple times over the span of five years and multiple election cycles. The arguments set forth to support this type of dereliction in elected duties is "incredulous" and "almost beyond description."

D. Davis was a member of the Board that declared her spot vacant and
abided by that declaration, waiving any right to hold over.
Another key difference between the situation presented in Clark and the situation with
Respondent Davis, is that Davis was a member of the group that declared her seat vacant. In Clark, the
Kootnai County Commissioners declared the seat vacant. The elected county commissioners are not
part of the elected Clerk's office, nor are they constitutionally part of the office. Wonnacott objected to
the declaration and refused to vacate the office. In this case Director Davis was a part of the SVC RD
Board of Directors. As early as December 7, 2010, Davis was willing to go along with the decision to
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declare the seat vacant. See letter from Stephanie Bonney dated December 7, 2010, n.5 supra. At no
time did Davis object to this declaration of vacancy. Director Davis went along with the decision,
probably with the secret understanding she would be appointed in the interim. Respondent Davis vacated the position and then accepted the appointment without advance notice to the public and was
sworn in to serve as the newly appointed Director for the new term in the interim pending the election.
Even if Davis had the right to hold over as a director, she certainly had the ability to waive that
right. By going along with the Board's decision to declare the seat vacant, submitting her request to fill
the vacancy, and then accepting and being sworn in as the Director for the new term, Davis waived any
right she had to hold over.
Davis's consent to the decision and the SVCRD Board's illegal appointment of her is recorded
in the January 11, 2011 minutes. Davis's answer to the complaint admits the subdistrict 3 term held by
Davis would terminate January 1, 2011. Davis Answer pg. 4. It is clear from the record before this
Court Davis intended to relinquish her director position. The record is also clear from the emails between the SVCRD attorneys Stephanie Bonnie and Paul Fitzer and the Idaho Secretary of State's Office and the Idaho Attorney General's Office that this course of conduct was acceptable. Davis relied
on bad advice when making her decision, but none-the-less followed that advice and voluntarily gave
up her position. She cannot now claim a legal right on something she voluntarily gave up and re-write
history. She made the history.

E. The Usurpation Action Was Not Moot Upon Yvette Davis's Election Loss
in May 2011.
The Respondents urge this Court to uphold the District Court's opinion the case became moot
upon the loss of election of Yvette Davis to the challenger in the replacement election never voted on
by the SVCRD Board, but announced to the public by their attorney Stephanie Bonney. This argument
ignores the clear guidance on this issue specifically setting out in the cases declaring the issue is
viewed at the time the case is brought, and not sometime later. Historically, usurpation has been considered quasi criminal in nature. As a result, simply changing the circumstances does not change
whether the person was usurping office at the time the action was brought. It is clear usurpation actions are decided on the circumstances at the time the action was brought. Simply vacating office to
avoid the usurpation action runs contrary to the established law and public policy. If someone is usurping office and are still in office without the color of law at the time the action was brought, they cannot
escape the possible consequences simply by relinquishing the office.
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In the same manner, bad Yvette Davis won the election, it would not have voided the State's
action against her, but it would have validated her term of service from the date of the canvassing of the
election forward. Whether she was usurping office prior to the election would still remain an issue unresolved by the election.
The impact of allowing someone to relinquish office to avoid litigation is contrary to public policy and contrary to the case law on the matter. By allowing the case to be mooted, this Court would be
allowing someone to willfully usurp office and avoid accountability for that usurpation by resigning on
the eve of trial. Thus, the usurper could usurp office through negotiations with the prosecuting attorney's office, continue to usurp during the pendency of the case, and then resign on the eve of hearing
making the case moot. Just as in this case, that course of conduct could result in months of usurpation
only to have no recourse upon the resignation of the usurper. This interpretation would render the law
meaningless, gutting the statute and diluting the lawful election process.
In arguing the case is moot, the respondents ignore the potential penalties for usurping office
other than removal from office. Though removal from office is primary penalty for holding office illegally, there are other penalties as well. Idaho Code § 6-608.

2. Attorney's Fees Should Not Be Granted To Respondents
A. The VCPA's actions were made with a reasonable basis in fact or law and
were required by Idaho Code.
Assuming, arguendo, this Court does not reverse the District Court's decision dismissing the
case and remand the case for further proceedings; attorney's fees should not be granted. As the respondents point out, attorney's fees should be awarded if the non-prevailing party acted without reasonable basis in fact or law. The District Court, after looking at all the evidence and facts presented
ruled as follows:
The Court cannot find that this action, initiated by the State, was done without a reasonable basis in fact or law. This was a course of conduct that occurred during the course of four election cycles. The State had a duty and obligation to investigate this matter and to present to the Court what they believed to be substantial procedural irregularities. The Court has ruled that the actions were de minimus. that
these officers held their office pursuant to the de facto officer doctrine, and that the
State did not have standing to pursue these procedural claims. All of that being said,
the Court cannot find that pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, that this was a groundless action or that the District has borne an unfair and unjustified financial burden
defending against groundless charges. Memorandum Decision pg. 11.
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The District Court not only rejected the Respondent's groundless claim, the District Court specifically ruled the "State !tad a duty and obligation to investigate this matter and present to the Court
what they believed to be substantial procedural irregularities." Id. (emphasis added). In other words,
there were so many irregularities in the various election cycles; as demonstrated in the record, the State
had to bring the case. Further, the appointment of Yvette Davis in direct contradiction to the authority
granted the directors under state law, coupled with the Respondents' collective stonewalling refusal to
address the situation with the VCPA required that such a case be brought.
As the record shows in this case, the VCPA's office did not want to get involved with the case.
When individuals first brought what was going on at the SVCRD and the election irregularities, the individuals were turned away and told to go speak with the Secretary of State's Office. It was only after
review of the appropriate statute did the VCPA agree to look in to the matter. After finding the multiple violations of Idaho Law, including the illegal appointment of Davis, the VCPA followed the statute.
The usurpation statute is very specific and requires the prosecutor bring the case. The VCP A would
have been avoiding a statutory requirement had it ignored the evidence brought to it.

B. The Respondents Lack Standing to Seek Attorney's Fees.
Several of the Respondents in this case were sitting SVC RD Board members when the initial
cases were filed. As a result, these individuals, being sued in their individual capacities, did not pay for
their individual defenses but rather voted to pay for the defense of their suits with tax collected funds
when the District Court denied the State's motion to prohibit the SVCRD from expending public funds
for the legal defenses of the individual Respondents. Since the Respondents did not pay for their legal
defenses and the SVCRD is not party to this litigation or the appeals, the Respondents lack standing to
seek attorney's fees for their defense as the SVCRD paid those expenses and the Respondents are correspondingly not entitled .to any recovery for the same.
The Respondents make this point, calling it "[w]orthy ofICRP l l(a)(l) sanctions" for seeking a
fine of up to $5,000 on Mr. Cowles for something in his "individual" capacity for errors the SVCRD
Board made. It is ironic the Respondents completely ignored the "individual" capacity of the suits
when voting to make the people of the SVCRD pay for defense of the "individual" suits.
This issue became especially clear when the VCPA 's office negotiated a tentatively acceptable
settlement with the newly elected SVCRD Board to end this litigation prior to any briefing on appeal.
However, because the SVC RD Board was not the named party they could not dispose of the cases,
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even though the SVC RD had paid for the entire litigation and were still paying at the time of the tentative resolution.

CONCLUSION
The State urges the Court to promote democracy and accountability of public officials in open
government and find that meaningful notice, suffrage and elections are worthy of judicial protection in
accordance with traditional and valued notions of substantial justice and the expectations of the Idaho
and American citizens.
DATED this 29th day of May, 2012

Matthew C. Williams
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I caused a trne and correct copy of the forgoing document to be served on the persons identified
below on the date and in the manner set forth below.
Paul J. Fitzer
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202
DATED this

Two Copies Via U.S.P.S. Priority Mail, Postage Prepaid

2r~ay of May, 2012.
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